In the book, I argue that the mind can be explained computationally because it is itself computational—whether it engages in mental arithmetic, parses natural language, or processes the auditory signals that allow us to experience music. All these capacities arise from complex information-processing operations of the mind. By analyzing the state of the art in cognitive science, I develop an account of computational explanation used to explain the capacities in question.

The logic of change formulated by K. Świętorzecka, has its motivation coming from the Aristotelian theory of substantial change which is undrstood as a transformation consisting in the disappearing and becoming of individual substances. The transition: becoming/disapearing (and conversely) is expressed in by the primitive operator C, to be read: it changes that …, and it is mapped by the progressively expanding language. We are interested in attributive changes of individual substances. We consider a formalism with two non-normal and not (...) mutually definable operators of possible and necessary change, inspired by Aristotelian distinction of accidental and essential attributes. From we adopt the idea that temporal concepts are defined via change operators, and the idea of an expanding language. In what follows, We axiomatise our new logic and describe its semantics, giving the proof of its completeness. We compare our formalism with selected modal logics. (shrink)

Publication date: 30 November 2016 Source: Author: Marcin Böhm The Empire of Nicaea was a successor of the Byzantium shattered in 1204. In the newly established state marine traditions of Byzantines, remain alive. The best testimony to this, are the evidence contained in the chronicle of Georgios Akropolites, devoted to activities of the rulers of Nicaea, aimed to build their own naval forces. In this paper I'll also try to answer, where was beating the heart of the Nicean shipbuilding (...) industry and how large was the navy of this state. This is important from point of view of the maritime history, because of the fleet of the Empire of Nicaea, filled the gap created after the fall of Constantinople and the Byzantine Empire, which was the local naval power in previous centuries. Akropolites give us a clear and direct answer to a question, where we should search for a center of Nicaean shipbuilding industry. Georgios Akropolites suggest us, that was in two towns, Holkos and Smyrna. The above-mentioned fleet consisted of the few squadrons, each counting 5-6 ships. We can only guess that a fleet of the John III, could count about 50 warships, whose quality was worse to that belonging to the Venetians. We must say that the fleet of the Empire of Nicaea, which we see in the chronicle of Akropolites, was the force, that lent itself to the support of ground forces. And in this role worked well. The situation was different when it comes to clashing with the Venetians, with the experienced crews of their ships, who surpassed Nicaean in this matter. Even with the advantage of numbers, Nicaean was unable to overcome at the sea, the citizens of the Republic of St. Mark. The plan to build their own naval forces, which was taken by the emperors of Nicaea, was a good direction. (shrink)

In the paper we investigate Birkhoff’s conditions and. We prove that a discrete lattice L satisfies the condition ) if and only if L is a 4-cell lattice not containing a cover-preserving sublattice isomorphic to the lattice S*7. As a corollary we obtain a well known result of J. Jakub´ık from [6]. Furthermore, lattices S7 and S*7 are considered as so-called partially cover-preserving sublattices of a given lattice L, S7 ≪ L and S7 ≪ L, in symbols. It is shown (...) that an upper continuous lattice L satisfies if and only if L is a 4-cell lattice such that S7 ≪/ L. The final corollary is a generalization of Jakubík’s theorem for upper continuous and strongly atomic lattices. Keywords: Birkhoff’s conditions, semimodularity conditions, modular lattice, discrete lattices, upper continuous lattice, strongly atomic lattice, cover-preserving sublattice, cell, 4-cell lattice. (shrink)

In this paper, I suggest that the notion of module explicitly defined by Peter Carruthers in The Architecture of The Mind (Carruthers 2006) is not really In use in the book. Instead, a more robust notion seems to be actually in play. The more robust notion, albeit implicitly assumed, seems to be far more useful for making claims about the modularity of mind. Otherwise, the claims would become trivial. This robust notion will be reconstructed and improved upon by putting it (...) into a more general framework of mental architecture. I defend the view that modules are the outcome of structural rather than functional decomposition and that they should be conceived as near decomposable systems. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to deal with the triviality threat to computationalism. On one hand, the controversial and vague claim that cognition involves computation is still denied. On the other, contemporary physicists and philosophers alike claim that all physical processes are indeed computational or algorithmic. This claim would justify the computationalism claim by making it utterly trivial. I will show that even if these two claims were true, computationalism would not have to be trivial.

The topic of this paper is the foundation for individual rights proposed by David Gauthier in his seminal 1986 book Morals by Agreement, and particularly the role of conception of rationality in this foundation. The foundation of rights is a part of Gauthier’s broader enterprise: to ground morals in rationality – more specifically, in the economic conception of rationality. Because of the importance of this conception for the whole of Gauthier’s project, we reconstruct first the conception of rationality which can (...) be found in decision theory and game theory, presenting simultaneously in a relatively non-technical way some basic concepts of the aforementioned disciplines. We proceed then to reconstruction of the foundation of rights itself – it turns on Gauthier’s interpretation of the so-called “Lockean proviso.” Lastly, we turn to the connection between rationality and foundation of rights. It is to be found in the narrow compliance – the disposition to enter only into cooperation which satisfies conditions of fairness set out in part by the Lockean proviso. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on a problem related to teleological theories of content namely, which notion of function makes content causally relevant? It has been claimed that some functional accounts of content make it causally irrelevant, or epiphenomenal; in which case, such notions of function could no longer act as the pillar of naturalized semantics. By looking closer at biological questions about behavior, I argue that past discussion has been oriented towards an ill-posed question. What I defend is a (...) Very Boring Hypothesis: depending on the representational phenomenon and the explanatory question, different aspects might be important, and it is difficult to say a priori which ones these might be. There are multiple facets to biological functionality and causality relevant for explaining representational phenomena, and ignoring them will lead to unmotivated simplifications. In addition, accounting for different facets of functionality helps dispense with intuition-based specifications of cognitive phenomena. (shrink)

Most dialectical models view argumentation as a process of critically testing a standpoint. Further, they assume that what we critically test can be analytically reduced to individual and bi-polar standpoints. I argue that these two assumptions lead to the dominant view of dialectics as a bi-partisan argumentative discussion in which the yes-side argues against the doubter or the no-side. I scrutinise this binary orientation in understanding argumentation by drawing on the main tenets of normative pragmatic and pragma-dialectical theories of argumentation. (...) I develop my argument by showing how argumentative practice challenges these assumptions. I then lay out theoretical reasons for this challenge. This paves the way for an enhanced conceptualisation of dialectical models and their standards of rationality in terms of multi-party discussions, or argumentative polylogues. (shrink)

Ulrich showed that most of the known axiomatisations of the classical equivalence calculus (EC) are D-incomplete, that is, they are not complete with the condensed detachment rule (D) as the primary rule of the proof procedure. He proved that the axiomatisation EEpEqrErEqp, EEEpppp by Wajsberg is D-complete and pointed out a number of D-complete single axioms, including one organic single axiom. In this paper we present new single axioms for EC with the condensed detachment and the reversed condensed detachment rules (...) that form D-complete bases and are organic. (shrink)

The essay critically examines the main claim of the book Religia jako idolatria [Religion as Idolatry] by Ireneusz Ziemiński, according to which religion is necessarily idolatry. The author argues that the thesis is insufficiently justified and points out several topic that require further discussion.

The article covers Erwin W. Straus’ views on the problem of time and temporal experience in the context of psychopathology. Beside Straus’ published scholarship, including his papers dealing exclusively with the subject of time, the sources utilized in this essay comprise several of Straus’ unpublished manuscripts on temporality, with the primary focus on the 1952 manuscript Temporal Horizons, which is discussed in greater detail and subsequently published for the first time in this journal. In the first part of the article, (...) the author introduces what he considers to be the central tension of the whole of Straus’ work on the issue of time, namely, the tension stemming from a dualistic account of time with its personal and impersonal dimensions. Interpretative developments of this tension are followed covering Straus’ early German works and his late American scholarship. The author presents Straus’ way of overcoming the dualistic account of time and his arguments in favour of what is termed here the “unified view of time”. Of critical importance for the unified view is Straus’ concept of “today”, which is extensively commented upon. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on the psychopathological consequences of the unified view as seen by Straus. A clear-cut boundary between a normal and a psychotic experience of time is supposed to lie in breaking the bond between the personal and the impersonal orders of time, leading to a fundamental estrangement. This view, it is claimed, is already present in a nutshell in Straus’ earliest work, and is elaborated upon later. In conclusion, both the merits and the weaknesses of Straus’ account of temporality are presented. A major advantage is that Straus abstains from a dualistic conception of time and reappraises the often-devalued clock time. A fundamental drawback is that Straus does not venture to explore the pathological varieties of temporal experience and fails to specify the acknowledged differences between, on the one hand, psychotic elements in depressive disorders, and, on the other hand, such elements in schizophrenic disturbances. (shrink)

In this article I address the following question: When are reformulations in argumentative criticisms reasonable and when do they become fallacious straw men? Following ideas developed in the integrated version of pragma-dialectics, I approach argumentation as an element of agonistic exchanges permeated by arguers’ strategic manoeuvring aimed at effectively defeating the opponent with reasonable means. I propose two basic context-sensitive criteria for deciding on the reasonableness of reformulations: precision of the rules for interpretation (precise vs. loose) and general expectation of (...) cooperativeness (critical vs. constructive). On the basis of analysis of examples taken from online political discussions, I argue that in some contexts, especially those that are critical and loose, what might easily be classified as a straw man following conventional treatment should be taken as a harsh, yet reasonable, strategic argumentative criticism. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of metalinguistic comparatives such as more dumb than crazy in which they differ from ordinary comparatives in the scale on which they compare: ordinary comparatives use scales lexically determined by particular adjectives, but metalinguistic ones use a generally-available scale of imprecision or ‘pragmatic slack’. To implement this idea, I propose a novel compositional implementation of the Lasersohnian pragmatic-halos account of imprecision—one that represents clusters of similar meanings as Hamblin alternatives. In the theory that results, existential (...) closure over alternatives mediates between alternative-sets and meanings in which imprecision has been resolved. I then articulate a version of this theory in which the alternatives are not related meanings but rather related utterances, departing significantly from Lasersohn’s original conception. Although such a theory of imprecision is more clearly ‘metalinguistic’, the evidence for it from metalinguistic comparatives in English is surprisingly limited. The overall picture that emerges is one in which the grammatical distinction between ordinary and metalinguistic comparatives tracks the independently motivated distinction between vagueness and imprecision. (shrink)

The paper discusses the role of systemic means of persuasion in argument evaluation. The core class of systemic means of persuasion is regress stoppers, whose fundamental function is to halt the infinite regress of justification by making claims, premises, or overall position expressed in a persuasive message more acceptable to a recipient. The paper explores how systemic means of persuasion contribute to the structure of arguments in the Toulmin model and serve as cues for heuristic processing of persuasive messages. It (...) also presents the results of the stylometric analysis and statistical data on the usage of systemic means of persuasion in three corpora which suggest that systemic means of persuasion constitute strategies independent of the strategy based on explicit argumentation marked by inference indicators. (shrink)

This paper offers a new way to make sense of disagreement expansion from a polylogical perspective by incorporating various places in addition to players and positions into the analysis. The concepts build on prior implicit ideas about disagreement space by suggesting how to more fully account for argumentative context, and its construction, in large-scale complex controversies. As a basis for our polylogical analysis, we use a New York Times news story reporting on an oil train explosion—a significant point in the (...) broader controversy over producing oil and gas via hydraulic fracturing. (shrink)

Dialectical approaches traditionally conceptualize argumentation as a discussion in which two parties debate on “two sides of an issue”. However, many political issues engender multiple positions. This is clear in multi-party online deliberations in which often an array of competing positions is debated in one and the same discussion. A proponent of a given position thus addresses a number of possible opponents, who in turn may hold incompatible opinions. The goal of this paper is to shed extra light on such (...) “polylogical” clash of opinions in online deliberation, by examining the multi-layered participation in actual online debates. The examples are drawn from the readers’ discussions on Osama bin Laden’s killing in online versions of two British newspapers: The Guardian and The Telegraph. As a result of the analysis, a distinction between sides, positions, and cases in argumentative deliberation is proposed. (shrink)

Predictive processing (PP) has been repeatedly presented as a unificatory account of perception, action, and cognition. In this paper, we argue that this is premature: As a unifying theory, PP fails to deliver general, simple, homogeneous, and systematic explanations. By examining its current trajectory of development, we conclude that PP remains only loosely connected both to its computational framework and to its hypothetical biological underpinnings, which makes its fundamentals unclear. Instead of offering explanations that refer to the same set of (...) principles, we observe systematic equivocations in PP‐based models, or outright contradictions with its avowed principles. To make matters worse, PP‐based models are seldom empirically validated, and they are frequently offered as mere just‐so stories. The large number of PP‐based models is thus not evidence of theoretical progress in unifying perception, action, and cognition. On the contrary, we maintain that the gap between theory and its biological and computational bases contributes to the arrested development of PP as a unificatory theory. Thus, we urge the defenders of PP to focus on its critical problems instead of offering mere re‐descriptions of known phenomena, and to validate their models against possible alternative explanations that stem from different theoretical assumptions. Otherwise, PP will ultimately fail as a unified theory of cognition. (shrink)

Despite the continuous emphasis on globalization, we witness increasing divisions and divisiveness in all domains of human activities. One of the reasons, if not the main one, is the intellectual fragmentation of humanity, compared in the title to the failed attempt at building the Biblical Tower of Babel. The attempts to reintegrate worldview, fragmented by the specialization of education (C.P. Snow’s The Two Cultures) and expected to be achieved through reforms in curricula at all levels of education, were based on (...) the assumption that the design of a curriculum should focus on the wide distribution of subjects of study, as if the distribution was the goal. The key point is not the distribution of themes, but the development of skills in the integration of knowledge. The quantitative assessment of the width of knowledge by the number of disciplines is of secondary importance. We cannot expect the miracle that students without any intellectual tools developed for this purpose would perform the job of integration, which their teachers do not promote or demonstrate, and which they cannot achieve for themselves. There are many other reasons for the increasing interest in making inquiries interdisciplinary, but there is little progress in the methodology of the integration of knowledge. This paper is a study of the transition from multidisciplinarity to interdisciplinarity, and further, to transdisciplinarity, with some suggestions regarding the use of methodological tools of structuralism and the choice of a conceptual framework. (shrink)

The novel "Mephisto" is one of the most well-known texts by Klaus Mann. Its fame results not only from its literary virtuosity, but also and primarily from the enormous media attention which was caused by the novel’s publication. The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, in which it dealt with the relationship between freedom of art and other constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals, launched the unprecedented career of this novel. This article describes Klaus Mann’s political views and their development in (...) the 1920s during the time when the National Socialist movement was strengthening and the writer made the decision to emigrate. The essay deals with the circumstances of creating the novel considering both biographical and political issues. The novelist is described from the perspective of the reality of the 1930s during the National Socialist regime and the time after his emigration. The concern of the article is not a literary analysis of the novel, but to take a look at the novelist’s development up until the moment of finishing his work as a protest against National Socialism. Another goal of the essay is to analyze the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, which regards the balance between freedom of art and other basic rights. Considering the synergy of both methodological approaches and the interdisciplinary view on the problem, the article represents a novel attempt to give a complex view on the relationship between art and the reality of a totalitarian state and between the relationship art–state in the conditions of a democratic state. (shrink)

With every σ-ideal I on a Polish space we associate the σ-ideal I* generated by the closed sets in I. We study the forcing notions of Borel sets modulo the respective σ-ideals I and I* and find connections between their forcing properties. To this end, we associate to a σ-ideal on a Polish space an ideal on a countable set and show how forcing properties of the forcing depend on combinatorial properties of the ideal. We also study the 1—1 or (...) constant property of σ-ideals, i.e., the property that every Borel function defined on a Borel positive set can be restricted to a positive Borel set on which it either 1—1 or constant. We prove the following dichotomy: if I is a σ-ideal generated by closed sets, then either the forcing P I adds a Cohen real, or else I has the 1—1 or constant property. (shrink)

A formal language is positional if it involves a positional connecitve, i.e. a connective of realization to relate formulas to points of a kind, like points of realization or points of relativization. The connective in focus in this paper is the connective “R”, first introduced by Jerzy Łoś. Formulas [Rαφ] involve a singular name α and a formula φ to the effect that φ is satisfied relative to the position designated by α. In weak positional calculi no nested occurences of (...) the connective “R” are allowed. The distribution problem in weak positional logics is actually the problem of distributivity of the connective “R” over classical connectives, viz. the problem of relation between the occurences of classical connectives inside and outside the scope of the positional connective “R”. (shrink)

According to Bocheński’s description of the history of formal logic, there clearly is some objective development, though far from being cumulative or linear. The history of logic throughout the world consists of three relatively short pinnacles preceded by also short periods of awakening and followed by periods of extensive commentary running into long periods of standstill and decadence, when nearly all achievements are consigned to oblivion.

In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is important, it was already solved in natu- ralized semantics, and satisfactory solutions to the problem do not rely merely on the notion of information as covariance. I point out that Hutto and Myin have double standards for linguistic and mental representation, which leads to a peculiar inconsistency. Were they to apply the same standards to basic and linguistic minds, they would (...) either have to embrace representationalism or turn to semantic nihilism, which is, as I argue, an unstable and unattractive position. Hence, I conclude, their book does not offer an alternative to representation- alism. At the same time, it reminds us that representational talk in cognitive science cannot be taken for granted and that information is different from men- tal representation. Although this claim is not new, Hutto and Myin defend it forcefully and elegantly. (shrink)

We consider the notion of everyday language. We claim that everyday language is semantically bounded by the properties expressible in the existential fragment of second–order logic. Two arguments for this thesis are formulated. Firstly, we show that so–called Barwise's test of negation normality works properly only when assuming our main thesis. Secondly, we discuss the argument from practical computability for finite universes. Everyday language sentences are directly or indirectly verifiable. We show that in both cases they are bounded by second–order (...) existential properties. Moreover, there are known examples of everyday language sentences which are the most difficult in this class (NPTIME–complete). (shrink)

The paper gives a survey of known results related to computational devices (finite and push–down automata) recognizing monadic generalized quantifiers in finite models. Some of these results are simple reinterpretations of descriptive—feasible correspondence theorems from finite–model theory. Additionally a new result characterizing monadic quantifiers recognized by push down automata is proven.

The concept of green chemistry dominated the imagination of environmentally-minded chemists over the last thirty years. The conceptual frameworks laid by the American Environmental Protection Agency scholars in the 1990s constitute today the core of a line of thinking aimed at transforming chemistry into a sustainable science. And yet, in the shadow of green chemistry, a broader, even if less popular, concept of sustainable chemistry started taking shape. Initially, it was either loosely associated with green chemistry or left undefined as (...) a distinct but generaly different approach. In such a vague form, it was endorsed by the organizations such as OECD and the IUPAC in the late 1990s. It was not until the 2010s however, when it solidified as a separate more embracing and more overarching tradition that could compete with green chemistry by offering insights that the latter lacked. Sustainable chemistry seeks to transcend the narrow focus on chemical synthesis and embrace a much more holistic view of chemical activities including social responsibility and sustainable business models. Due to an interesting historical coincidence, it was in Germany where sustainable chemistry took roots and became institutionalized for the first time. It was thanks to German exceptionalism and the unwillingness of German scholars to embrace the “green” terminology originating from the US, the concept of sustainable chemistry could safely mature and develop in the German-speaking world, before reaching a high degree of formalization with dedicated journals, founding articles, and programmatic principles aspiring to transform the entire chemical enterprise in the years to come. (shrink)

The claim defended in the paper is that the mechanistic account of explanation can easily embrace idealization in big-scale brain simulations, and that only causally relevant detail should be present in explanatory models. The claim is illustrated with two methodologically different models: Blue Brain, used for particular simulations of the cortical column in hybrid models, and Eliasmith’s SPAUN model that is both biologically realistic and able to explain eight different tasks. By drawing on the mechanistic theory of computational explanation, I (...) argue that large-scale simulations require that the explanandum phenomenon is identified; otherwise, the explanatory value of such explanations is difficult to establish, and testing the model empirically by comparing its behavior with the explanandum remains practically impossible. The completeness of the explanation, and hence of the explanatory value of the explanatory model, is to be assessed vis-à-vis the explanandum phenomenon, which is not to be conflated with raw observational data and may be idealized. I argue that idealizations, which include building models of a single phenomenon displayed by multi-functional mechanisms, lumping together multiple factors in a single causal variable, simplifying the causal structure of the mechanisms, and multi-model integration, are indispensable for complex systems such as brains; otherwise, the model may be as complex as the explanandum phenomenon, which would make it prone to so-called Bonini paradox. I conclude by enumerating dimensions of empirical validation of explanatory models according to new mechanism, which are given in a form of a “checklist” for a modeler. (shrink)

This work revisits the problem of breathing cues used for management of speaking turns in multiparty casual conversation. We propose a new categorisation of turn-taking events which combines the criterion of speaker change with whether the original speaker inhales before producing the next talkspurt. We demonstrate that the latter criterion provides a good proxy for pragmatic completeness of the previous utterance (and, by extension, of the interruptive character of the incoming speech). We also present evidence that breath holds are used (...) in reaction to incoming talk rather than as a turn-holding cue. In addition to analysing dimensions which are routinely omitted in studies of interactional functions of breathing (exhalations, presence of overlapping speech, breath holds), the present study also looks at patterns of breath holds in silent breathing and shows that breath holds are sometimes produced towards the beginning (and towards the top) of silent exhalations, potentially indicating an abandoned intention to take the turn. We claim that the breathing signal can thus be successfully used for uncovering \emph{hidden} turn-taking events, which are otherwise obscured by silence-based representations of interaction. (shrink)

In the present paper we address the old question of respiratory planning in speech production. We recast the problem in terms of speakers’ communicative goals and propose that speakers try to minimise respiratory effort in line with H&H theory. We analyze respiratory cycles coinciding with no speech (i.e. silence), short verbal feedback expressions (SFE’s) as well as longer vocalisations in terms of parameters of the respiratory cycle and find little evidence for respiratory planning in feedback production. We also investigate timing (...) of speech and SFEs in the exhalation and contrast it with nods. We find that while speech is strongly tied to the exhalation onset, SFEs are distributed much more uniformly throughout the exhalation and are often produced on residual air. Given that nods, which do not have any respiratory constraints, tend to be more frequent towards the end of an exhalation, we propose a mechanism whereby respiratory patterns are determined by the trade-off between speakers’ communicative goals and respiratory constraints. (shrink)

The article presents possible applications of Paul Ricoeur’s theory in interpretation of legal texts and legally relevant human action. One should notice that Paul Ricoeur developed a comprehensive interpretation theory of two seemingly distant phenomena: literary texts and human action. When interrelating these issues, it becomes possible, on the basis of Ricoeur’s work, to construct a unified theory of the interpretation of legal texts and of legally relevant human action. What is provided by this theory for jurisprudence is the possibility (...) of formulating a comprehensive theory of application of law, well established in the ontology of the recipient of the legal text. It should be emphasised that the resulting benefits, outlined in the article become particularly noticeable when set against the background of the methodological weaknesses of legal positivism, concerning both the interpretation of law and a syllogistic model of its application. (shrink)

This paper addresses the following question: Can one and the same utterance token, in one unique speech situation, intentionally and conventionally perform a plurality of illocutionary acts? While some of the recent literature has considered such a possibility Perspectives on pragmatics and philosophy. Springer, Cham, pp 227–244, 2013; Johnson in Synthese 196:1151–1165, 2019), I build a case for it by drawing attention to common conversational complexities unrecognized in speech acts analysis. Traditional speech act theory treats communication as: a dyadic exchange (...) between a Speaker and a Hearer who trade illocutionary acts endowed with one and only one primary force. I first challenge assumption by discussing two contexts where plural illocutionary forces are performed in dyadic discussions: dilemmatic deliberations and strategic ambiguity. Further, I challenge assumption by analyzing poly-adic discussions, where a speaker can target various participants with different illocutionary acts performed via the same utterance. Together, these analyses defend illocutionary pluralism as a significant but overlooked fact about communication. I conclude by showing how some phenomena recently analyzed in speech act theory—back-door speech acts New work on speech acts. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 144–164, 2018) and dog-whistles New work on speech acts. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 360–383, 2018)—implicitly presuppose illocutionary pluralism without recognizing it. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to introduce Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences’ thematic issue on disordered temporalities. The authors begin by discussing the main reason for the neglect of temporal experience in present-day psychiatric nosologies, mainly, its reduction to clock time. Methodological challenges facing research on temporal experience include addressing the felt sense of time, its structure, and its pre-reflective aspects in the life-world setting. In the second part, the paper covers the contributions to the thematic issue concerning temporal (...) experience in anxiety, depression, mania, addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, autism, and in recovery from psychosis. The authors argue in favor of integrative and cross-disciplinary approaches. In conclusion, they present time as a significant aspect of human suffering. (shrink)

The paper discusses the role of systemic means of persuasion in argument evaluation. The core class of systemic means of persuasion is regress stoppers, whose fundamental function is to halt the infinite regress of justification by making claims, premises, or overall position expressed in a persuasive message more acceptable to a recipient. The paper explores how systemic means of persuasion contribute to the structure of arguments in the Toulmin model and serve as cues for heuristic processing of persuasive messages. It (...) also presents the results of the stylometric analysis and statistical data on the usage of systemic means of persuasion in three corpora which suggest that systemic means of persuasion constitute strategies independent of the strategy based on explicit argumentation marked by inference indicators. (shrink)

In the paper, we tackle the matter of non-classical logics, in particular, paraconsistent ones, for which not every formula follows in general from inconsistent premisses. Our benchmark is Jaśkowski’s logic, modeled with the help of discussion. The second key origin of this paper is the matter of being tabular, i.e. being adequately expressible by finitely many finite matrices. We analyse Jaśkowski’s non-tabular discussive (discursive) logic $ \textbf {D}_{2}$, one of the first paraconsistent logics, from the perspective of a trivalent tabular (...) logic. We are motivated to step down from the ongoing modal $ \textbf {S5}$-perspective of developing $ \textbf {D}_{2}$ both by certain mysteries that have been surrounding it and by gaps in Jaśkowski’s arguments contra the multivalent tabular perspective. Although Jaśkowski’s idea to use $ \textbf {S5}$ in order to define $ \textbf {D}_{2}$ is very attractive since it allows one to benefit from the tools and results of modal logic, it also gives a ‘non-direct’ formulation and, as it appeared later, is superfluous with respect to what is meant to be achieved since one can define the very same logic but using modal logics weaker than S5. It is also known, due to Kotas, that discussive logic is not finite-valued. So, in light of Kotas’s result that $ \textbf {D}_{2}$ is non-tabular, we propose to associate it with a few dozen discussive formulae that Jaśkowski unequivocally and illustratively suggests to be its theorems or non-theorems rather than with axioms of its modern axiomatizations (one of which Kotas employs) in order to be capable of performing a computer-aided brute-force search for suitable trivalent matrices in the cases of one and two designated values. As a result, we find trivalent matrices with two designated values that might be dubbed ‘discussive’ because they meet Jaśkowski’s suggestion to validate and invalidate the litmus theorems and non-theorems, respectively, despite the fact that none of them validates all the negation axioms in the modern axiomatizations of $ \textbf {D}_{2}$. The matrices found are then analysed along with highlighting the ones that were previously mentioned in the literature. We conclude the paper with a comparative analysis of Omori’s results and a test of Karpenko’s hypothesis. (shrink)

The thesis of the paper holds that some future developments of argumentation theory may be inspired by the rich logico-methodological legacy of the Lvov–Warsaw School (LWS), the Polish research movement that was most active from 1895 to 1939. As a selection of ideas of the LWS which exploit both formal and pragmatic aspects of the force of argument, we present: Ajdukiewicz’s account of reasoning and inference, Bocheński’s analyses of superstitions or dogmas, and Frydman’s constructive approach to legal interpretation. This paper (...) does not aim at exhaustive elaboration of any of these topics or their usefulness in current discussions within argumentation theory. Rather, we intend to indicate chosen directions of a potentially fruitful research program for the emerging Polish School of Argumentation which would consist in application of methods and conceptions elaborated by the LWS to selected open problems of contemporary research on argumentation. (shrink)

Formal aspects of various ways of description of Jan Łukasiewicz’s four-valued modal logic £ are discussed. The original Łukasiewicz’s description by means of the accepted and rejected theorems, together with the four-valued matrix, is presented. Then the improved E.J. Lemmon’s description based upon three specific axioms, together with the relational semantics, is presented as well. It is proved that Lemmon’s axiomatic is not independent: one axiom is derivable on the base of the remanent two. Several axiomatizations, based on three, two (...) or one single axiom are provided and discussed, including S. Kripke’s axiomatics. It is claimed that (a) all substitutions of classical theorems, (b) the rule of modus ponens, (c) the definition of “◊” and (d) the single specific axiom schema: ⬜A ∧ B → A ∧ ⬜B, called the jumping necessity axiom, constitute an elegant axiomatics of the system £. (shrink)

In their extensive overview of various concepts of presumption Godden and Walton recognise “the heterogeneous picture of presumptions that exists in argumentation theory today”. I argue that this heterogeneity results from an epiphenomenal character of the notion of presumption. To this end, I first distinguish between three main classes of presumptions. Framework presumptions define the basic conditions of linguistic understanding and meaningful conversation. The “presumption of veracity” is their paradigm case. I argue that such presumptions are satisfactorily covered by the (...) Principle of Charity, or else Gricean maxims or satisfaction conditions for speech acts. Formal presumptions are general presumptive rules of argument, theorised as topoi or acceptable inference warrants, including institutional warrants. Material presumptions are acceptable outcomes of nested or outsourced arguments, which entitles arguers to use them as acceptable premises or opinions in further arguments without the typical burden of proof. If this is correct, then the study of presumption always collapses into the study of other, likely more fundamental, concepts. Does it render presumptions, by Occam’s Razor, altogether redundant in argumentation theory? I tentatively answer this question from a consistently conversational perspective on argumentation; I argue that the pragmatic grounds for presumptions are to be found in the conditions for speech act performance in the institutional social world, as developed by Searle. (shrink)

Ethics is one of the features of contemporary civilization. It is widely discussed and elaborated upon; it may even be taught or otherwise introduced into one’s life. One of the areas where ethics has become increasingly important is economic activity or, in broader terms, business. Business activity is the domain of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs). It brings about an array of both economic and social benefits. Such activity is performed by persons who differ in many respects (e. g. in (...) terms of age, education, social background, etc.) and whose key purpose is earning profit. Thus, a two-part question presents itself: can an entrepreneur, a businessman, be an ethical person? Is there any room for ethics in their activity? The aim that the researchers have set themselves is to answer the question of whether it is possible to discuss the ethics of the profession of an entrepreneur.The present article constitutes an attempt at entering into a discussion on the place of ethics in business activity. Deliberations based on a review of literature concerning eth­ics and entrepreneurship lead to a single conclusion – entrepreneur ethics should be discussed and potential future entrepreneurs should be taught ethical conduct. (shrink)

Using the profiles of dialogue method we identify a species of ad verecundiam fallacy that works by forestalling of questioning in arguments from expert opinion. A profile of dialogue is a graph structure used to model a sequence of speech acts surrounding both the putting forward of an argument and the response to it at the next moves in a dialogue. The method is applied to a case of cross-examining a software engineer in a legal deposition in a case of (...) intellectual property litigation. (shrink)

In this chapter, I sketch the history of mechanistic models of the mental, as related to the technological project of trying to build mechanical minds, and discuss the contemporary debates on psychological and cognitive explanations. In the first section, I introduce the Cartesian notion of mechanism, which has shaped the debate in the centuries to follow. Early mechanistic proposals are also connected with early attempts to formulate the computational account of thinking and reasoning, upheld notably by Hobbes and Leibniz. In (...) the second section, associationist and behaviorist models of the mind are sketched, along with attempts to understand the neural system in terms of connections and associations. Early robotic models, built mostly by behaviorists and other students of animal behavior, are also introduced. In the third section, the focus is on early computational and cybernetic models of the mind. In the fourth section, I deal with computational models of mental mechanisms as proposed by students of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. Then, I sketch the contemporary debate over the question whether computational and psychological models are best understood as offering functional, or maybe mechanistic explanations. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose foundations for a formal model of representation and numerical evaluation of a possibly broad class of arguments, including those that occur in natural discourse. Since one of the most characteristic features of everyday argumentation is the occurrence of convergent reasoning, special attention should be paid to the operation ⊕, which allows us to calculate the logical force of convergent arguments with an accuracy not offered by other approaches.

The use of an elaborate system of co-verbial constructions is the hallmark of the Hungarian language and one of the biggest challenges a translator or a learner of this language has to face. Co-verbial constructions consist of verbs, or their derivates, accompanied by a limited number of prefixes or particles that modify their meanings. They not only perform numerous syntactic and lexical functions, which is important in terms of language production, but also are able to change the meaning of the (...) verb completely. The aim of this study is to trace the cognitive motivation behind the use of Hungarian co-verbial constructions with össze/szét and to show that the meanings developed by these constructions can be organized with reference to prototypical scenes structured in the form of a radial category. (shrink)

The paper describes the state and local parliamentary activity of Marcjan Ścibor Chełmski, one of the most interesting parliamentarians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the 17th century. The text is based on archival research including the Parliament manuscript diaries, private correspondence describing the debates; published sources: instructions, parliamentary resolutions, memoirs; and studies of the history of parliamentarism, on top of the functioning of the political elite and the circulation of information. M.S. Chełmski came from a family with a strong tradition (...) of public service settled in the Krakow province. He began his career as a parliamentarian by being elected to the Sejm in 1613, and later sat in the Parliaments of: 1616, 1618, 1619, 1620, 1621, 1625, 1626/I, 1626/II, 1629/I, 1629/II, 1631, 1632, 1633, 1634, 1635, 1637/I, 1637/II and 1638. He was one of the MPs who usually had a strong presence in the Chamber of Deputies. During the debates he addressed the issues of noble freedom in the spirit hostile to absolutum dominium, economic issues, procedural issues, and religious freedom. The collected source material confirms Chełmski’s great public activity in Lesser Poland and the evolution of his political stance at the Sejm from an oppositionist during the reign of Sigismund III Vasa to a moderate supporter of the royal court. Sources indicate that Chełmski had a reputation as an esteemed legal expert. He held the dignity of Marshal of the Crown Tribunal. For over 30 years he was one of the most active participants of the local parliament life in the Krakow province. The evolution of Chełmski’s political stance during the reign of Władysław IV Vasa resulted in his nomination for a prestigious office of the Chamberlain of Krakow. (shrink)

The main thesis underlying the methodological approach to argument evaluation holds that some arguments which employ knowledge-gaining procedures can be suc-cessfully evaluated by applying tools elaborated by the methodology of science, such as the rules for reasoning, classifying objects, defining, and questioning. The applica-tion of those rules to argument evaluation consists in comparing them with proce-dures employed in the case of argumentative practices performed either in scientific inquiry or in everyday life. In order to show how building the methodological ap-proach (...) to argument evaluation could be started, I examine two cases of evaluating arguments by means of several methodological rules of defining. The idea of apply-ing the rules governing various knowledge-gaining procedures to evaluating argu-ments is present in philosophy of science and in argumentation theory, but so far it has not been systematically elaborated. The paper aims at justifying this idea as a promising research project. (shrink)